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FORGOTTEN POINTS IN THE
"EXCLUSIONARY RULE" DEBATE
James Boyd White*

Most contemporary discussions of the "exclusionary rule" assume or assert that this "rule" is not part of the fourth amendment,
nor required by its terms, but is rather a judicial "remedy" that was
fashioned to protect those rights (against unreasonable search and
seizure) that actually are granted by the fourth amendment. 1 The
• Professor in the Law School, the College, and the Committee on the Ancient Mediterranean World, The University of Chicago. A.B. 1960, Amherst College; A.M. 1961; LL.B. 1964,
Harvard. - Ed. I wish to thank Cass Sunstein and Frank Easterbrook for helpful comments
on an earlier draft, and James Scarboro for many conversations on the fourth amendment,
whi!=h have no doubt much affected what I say here.
Since preparing this paper I have been shown a copy of Professor Loewy's article which is
to be published with it. Obviously I disagree with certain of Professor Loewy's assertions e.g., that "no reasonable method of constitutional interpretation supports Justice Douglas's
conclusion" in Warden v. Hayden - and I also think that his emphasis on protecting "innocent" people is somewhat misplaced. Many of those most vociferously opposed to the writs of
assistance were guilty of systematic violations of the customs laws; for them and their friends
the objection to those writs was not that they interfered with the rights of innocent people, but
that they permitted the enforcement of certain laws they regarded as evil. From this I do not
mean to suggest that we read partiality toward the criminal into the Constitution, but recognize that the fourth amendment, like the other essential rights guaranteed in the Constitution,
is at its heart a political right, grounded in a fundamental mistrust of government (and governors) and intended to reserve to the people certain rights to freedom and security which they
may well choose to exercise in ways disapproved ofby the ruling majority. This aspect of the
fourth amendment is obscured by the current academic and professional habit of talking about
all legal questions as "problems" - in this case the problems of crime control and police
regulation -which it is "our" object to try to solve. In this use of "we" and "our" there is both
a direct identification of the speaker and his audience with the government and an objectification of the central actors in the drama, the policeman and the suspect. This is an inappropriate
way to talk about Constitutional issues, for which the relevant ''we" includes not only the
government but those deeply opposed to it, not only the policymakers but those to be subjected
to the policy. A proper fourth amendment discourse would talk about the policeman and the
suspect both as people. On these points see White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way ofTalking
about People: A Study of the Robinson and Matlock Cases, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 165; White,
Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415 (1982).
With Professor Loewy's conclusion that the "exclusionary rule" should be regarded as an
essential part of the fourth amendment I am naturally much more sympathetic.
1. For a concise statement by advocates of this position, see the Supplemental Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 2, Illinois v. Gates, 51 U.S.L.W. 3415
(U.S. Nov. 29, 1982) (No. 81-430):
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment or any other provision of the Constitution either
directly or implicitly provides for the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from criminal
trials. Instead, decisions of this Court over the last decade have made it clear that the
exclusionary rule first enunciated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and
later extended to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), is a judicially-created
remedy, the paramount and perhaps sole purpose of which is the deterrence of unlawful
police conduct. As the deterrence rationale has achieved supremacy over earlier, now
discarded justifications for the rule, the Court has recognized that it makes sense to apply
the rule only to those situations in which its deterrent purpose will in fact be significantly
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protection is said to work by "deterring" official violations; this is,
however, an odd use of the word, for the rule does not punish violations but merely deprives the government of some of the benefits
that might ensue from them, namely the use in the criminal case of
evidence so obtained.
The deterrent view of the "exclusionary rule" receives support
from - perhaps it has its origins in - Wo!f v. Co!orado 2 which addressed the question whether the fourth amendment should be regarded as "incorporated" in the fourteenth, and hence applicable to
the states. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, purported to
apply to the states the "security of one's privacy against arbitrary
intrusion" which is "at the core of the fourth amendment"3 but to
withhold the "remedy" of exclusion, on the ground that principles of
federalism should allow the states freedom to make remedial choices
of their own. When the court overruled Wolf in Mapp v. Ohio,4 the
plurality opinion explicitly said that the deterrent theory was the basis of the exclusionary remedy. This belief continues5 accompanied
by occasional talk about the "imperative of judicial integrity." 6
The origins of what we now call the "exclusionary rule" were in
fact very different from what is suggested above. Far from being an
incidental rule designed to enforce other standards, the right to "exclusion" was, at least in some cases, an essential part of the fourth
amendment's protection. It was indeed more fully "substantive"
than those procedural protections - probable cause, warrant, specificity - that may now seem to be the heart of the fourth
amendment.
The historical roots of exclusion lie in a conception of property
which holds that even where a search is procedurally reasonable the
government simply has no right to seize the property of the citizen
for use against him in a criminal proceeding. This is so whether the
government uses the warrant mechanism or the milder discovery device employed inBoydv. United States. 1 While the Supreme Court
advanced. Accordingly, the Court now employs a cost benefit analysis whenever it considers whether the rule should be applied to particular situations. When the costs of applying the rule are found to outweigh whatever deterrent effect it might achieve, the rule
will not be imposed [citations omitted].
See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on tlte Four/It Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 360
(1974).
2. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
3. 338 U.S. at 27.
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 446 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,485 (1976); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599
(1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 359 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
7. I 16 U.S. 616 (1886) (court ordered production of an invoice describing the quantity and
value of twenty-nine cases of glass).
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first articulated this view in Boyd, it finds consistent and powerful
expressions running back through Entick v. Carrington, 8 to Hale's
Pleas of the Crown, 9 to Coke, and even earlier. At the time of Hale,
for example, evidently the only form of the search warrant known to
the law was the warrant for stolen goods. 10 Coke doubted even this,
but Hale supported it on the ground of social necessity; Entick on the
true owners higher right to possession. The same kind of reasoning
was used in America after Boyd to limit expressly the power of
search under warrant to those cases where "a primary right to such
search and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or
the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the
right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police
power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful
and provides that it may be taken." 11 Stolen goods are obviously
subject to seizure in this view, as both contraband and "instrumentalities of crime" as well: the defendant can have no right to possess
the former, and by his use of the latter has lost his right to possess
them and they become a kind of deodand. 12 This rule was explicitly
reaffirmed in United States v. Lefkowitz 13 and remained the law until
Warden v. Hayden.1 4
8. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (P.C. 1765).
9. 1st Am. ed. Philadelphia (1847).
10. Id. at bk. II, ch. 18.
11. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
12. A case like Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), involving the clothes worn in the
commission of a crime, would presumably be a borderline case that could go either way.
13. 285 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1932).
14. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), overruled Gouled on the ground that it depended on outmoded property concepts that were rationally related neither to the right to
privacy the Court found in the fourth amendment nor to the countervailing governmental
interest in investigating crime. In so doing, the opinion slid over the fact that the propertyimmunity rule of Boyd and Gouled had significant consequences for both (1) the probable
cause and specificity requirements and (2) the administration of the plain view rule.
Where an item meets the Boyd-Gouled requirements, the police are entitled to its possession; the only question that remains is whether they have sufficient reason to believe that it is
in the place they wish to search. The warrant, if obtained, can name the item, or class of item,
and the search can be tailored to its objects. If additional materials are found in the course of
the search, the only question the officer must ask is whether they meet the Boyd-Gou!ed requirement. But when this requirement is abandoned an additional question must now be
asked: whether the government's interest in possessing the item is sufficiently great to justify
its seizure. This is a complex and highly conjectural question for which the Court in Warden
gives no guidance. Is all "admissible" evidence seizable, as Federal Rule 41 declares? This
requires a legal judgment of a new and difficult kind; in many cases of an impossible kind, for
the ultimate admissibility of a particular item will depend on the way the issues have developed at trial, the duplicative nature of the evidence, and so forth.
Likewise, although the Warden Court claims that "testimonial" objects - such as letters or
diaries - remain immune from seizure, it is easy to see how that claim can be refuted: since
any statements contained in such documents exist before the seizure, and the seizure does not
compel. Finally, Warden makes the problem of third-party searches both more difficult and
more serious: under the earlier rule, the person on whose premises an item meeting the BoydGou!ed requirements could be found was, however innocently, the possessor of something he
was not entitled to possess, and a search of his premises for such items was therefore facially

1276

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:1273

This immunity derives from a conception of property that is
larger and deeper than our own. In England, property law was directly continuous with constitutional law: the property of a landholder gave him a kind of jurisdiction over it, with which others
could not interfere except through the Parliamentary process. Often,
indeed, land-owning entailed rights that seem to us even more obviously jurisdictional or political in kind: the right to hold a certain
court or to present a clerical living, for example, or the right to a seat
in the House of Lords. These rights were themselves inheritable,
and inheritable in connection with a landed estate. Liberty was conceived of in a similar way, as a kind of property in the arrangements
and traditions of the law itself. In his Reflections on the French
Revolution, for example, Burke said: "You will observe, that, from
Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right, it has been the uniform
policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity . . . ."1s
In America, the Constitution became explicit, and property came
to have different overtones, but it remained jurisdictional in character: Property was not what one held against a sovereign who had
notionally granted it (and whom one supported in return), but was
what one had not yielded to the governments one had created by the
process of social contract. 16 In both England and America property
and liberty were thus readily overlapping terms; both were ways of
conceiving of rights not as grants of power or capacity, to be justified
by their contribution to the general welfare, but as true entitlements.
You can "exclude the universe" from your property, in Blackstone's
phrase, not because it is wise or good that you should be able to do
so, but because your property is yours, to dispose of as you wish. 17
reasonable. Under Warden, however, one who perfectly rightly possesses items of his own
purchase, and even of his own manufacture, may be subject to search and seizure if those items
may be of use to the police or prosecution in the investigation or prosecution of others. See
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (police may search, pursuant to a warrant,
newspaper office for evidence of crime committed by individuals not associated with
newspaper).
15. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 37 (T. Mahoney ed., 1955).
On the role of law, especially property law, in the life of England, see William Blackstone's
inaugural lecture, "On the Study of Law," printed at the beginning of most editions of the
Commentaries. I w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3.
16. On liberty and property and their relation to popular sovereignty, see generally G.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 214-22 (1969); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 12-22 (1948). In this connection it is significant that each of the states had constitutional provisions similar both to the fourth amendment
and to the fifth amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination. This gives these
provisions a different standing from the first amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion, for example, which can be read as reserving to one sovereign the power
denied to the other.
17. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of
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Property was an extension of the person, indeed in some ways a definition of the person, for the relations defined by property holdings
were political and social as well as economic. This is perhaps why
the use of one's property in a criminal proceeding was felt to violate
the fifth amendment prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination,
as well as the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable
seizures. "The fourth and fifth amendments run almost into each
other," said the Court in Boyd. 18
The connection between the immunity principle and the "exclusionary rule" is plain enough. Where a seizure is unreasonable for
the substantive reason that immune property has been taken, the defendant is constitutionally entitled not only to its "exclusion" but to
its return. Its continued possession is a continuing wrong, and he is
entitled to get it back. In such a case the "exclusionary rule" is thus
required by the fourth amendment itself. Accordingly, Boyd - not,
as usually said, Weeks v. United States 19 - was in fact the first exclusion case.20 In Boyd the claimant produced the invoice under
protest and objected to its admission in evidence. In holding the resulting judgment of forfeiture invalid for this reason, the Court was
in fact holding that the claimant was entitled to the exclusion of the
invoice. And while the Court does not expressly allude to the possibility of derivative evidence, it is hard to believe that such evidence
as the testimony of the United States attorney as to what he saw
during the examination, or copies made by him, would have been
admitted either.
Weeks was the first case to apply the "exclusionary rule" to procedural defects, and it is plain that the Weeks court saw the rule not
mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in the total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe.
18. I 16 U.S. at 630. The kind of identity that the Boyd Court sees between the person and
his property, that is, makes it easy to regard the forcible production of one's property as the
equivalent of compelling the individual to be a witness against himself. What is more, when
the government tries, as in Boyd itself, to reduce the fourth amendment intrusion by requiring
the cooperation of the individual, the fifth amendment comes increasingly into play.
19. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
20. The statute under which the lower court proceeded in Boyd was drafted with a consciousness of the arguments that ultimately prevailed in that case, for it did not simply authorize the seizure and introduction into evidence of the invoice or other paper produced in
accordance with its terms, but provided that, if the paper is produced, the United States
attorney
shall be permitted, under direction of the court, to make examination (at which examination the defendant or claimant, or his agent, may be present) of such entries in said book,
invoice, or paper as relate to or tend to prove the allegation aforesaid and may offer the
same in evidence on behalf of the United States. But the owner of the said books and
papers, his agent or attorney, shall have, subject to order of the court, custody of them,
except pending their examination in court as aforesaid.
116 U.S. at 620-21 (Miller, J., concurring). In practice, however, the statute can not go so far
as it claims, for under its terms the respondent must yield at least temporary possession of the
documents, and it is hard to see how that is not a "seizure."
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as a deterrent meant to protect others against improper invasions in
the future, but as a rule designed to make the original prohibition
meaningful in the particular case of the person whose rights were
violated:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
fourth amendment declaring his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures is of no value, and asfar as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution . . . To
sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a
manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action. 21

When the rule was extended in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
21. 232 U.S. at 393-94 (emphasis added). The most natural and complete remedy is to
place the parties so far as possible in the situation that would have existed had the wrong never
occurred. See The Exclusionary Rule Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S.101, S.751, and S.1995, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 37277 (1982) (testimony of Prof. Yale Kamisar). See also Loewy, supra note I. While at private
law there is often a preference for a damage remedy over specific relief of this kind, the reasons
supporting that preference do not apply where one party is the government, the other an individual who holds constitutional rights of liberty and property against it. Damages would be a
kind of forced exchange, and however appropriate that may be in a commercial context where
all things are in principle exchangeable, it would be incompatible with the idea of a right
specifically against the government, and with the reasons why such rights exist. This is espe•
cially so when the right is in large part a political, and in this sense truly a constitutional right.
The right to be free from arbitrary and oppressive governmental interference with one's freedom of person and of place is an essential precondition to the exercise of all the other rights,
including those of expression and association, upon which our democratic system of self-government rests. And even at private law, specific reliefis often available where the wrong-doing
party has a continuing advantage of a kind for which the victim cannot readily be compensated, as is the case with improperly seized evidence.
But what of the interference with one's rights to property that is routinely imposed by the
obligation to produce papers and other objects for discovery purposes in civil litigation? The
Boyd Court discussed that question, noting that the Congress that passed the original judiciary
act provided for discovery orders in cases and circumstances permitted by chancery practice,
and that chancery practice has always prohibited the production of papers that would incriminate the party producing them. One's property rights are absolute in the Boyd-Gou/ed sense,
that is, when they are performing the jurisdictional and political function described above,
especially where the state is proceeding against the individual in a criminal action. The situation is obviously different where the government imposes obligations even-handedly upon all
its citizens for their mutual benefit. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
and my discussion of the civil-criminal distinction in White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way
ofTalking About People: A Study ofthe Robinson and Matlock Cases, 1974 Sup, CT. REV. 415,
at 165, 178-80, 209-16.
The power of the government to take "private property" for "public use" upon payment of
•~ust compensation,'' established by the fifth amendment, is not incompatible with my analysis: the requisite "public purposes" obviously can not include the purpose of convicting the
possessor or owner of the property, but rather must involve a relationship that is essentially
civil, in every sense of the term, between government and citizen. The main idea of the provision is to prevent the individual from holding up the government to obtain more than the fair
market value of this property, and thus appropriate to himself the portion of the value of his
property that is in fact created by the public use to which the government intends to put it. To
apply this reasoning to noneconomic rights the individual has against the government, such as
rights of liberty, choice, and freedom from harassment, would be inconsistent with the whole
idea of such rights, whether they are found in the first, the fourth, or the fifth amendments.
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States 22 to include the derivative use of improperly seized property
- in this case improperly seized papers were copied - this was a
natural outgrowth of the primary prohibition.
The exclusion of contraband, in which the defendant has no
rightful possessory interest, rests on a different but related basis. The
main idea of this exclusion is that of a remedy for a trespassory
wrong, not a means of regulating police in future cases. 23 A major
case is Agnello v. United States 24 where contraband seized during an
unreasonable search of the defendant's home was excluded. Before
this case, the practice had been for the defendant to petition for the
return of his property, but where the item is contraband, and its possession criminal, one can understand why defendants were reluctant
to do this. Agnello for the first time held that the fourth amendment
questions could be raised at trial, as well as upon pretrial petition,
and proceeded to exclude the contraband. The reason for this decision was not to deter police in other cases, but to make the original
procedural protections - probable cause and the warrant requirement - meaningful in the present case.
History thus reveals not one "exclusionary rule" but several, each
resting on a different basis and having a somewhat different scope.
The original rule was simply an automatic consequence of the Boyd
and Gouled view that one's property was immune from seizure; in
such cases exclusion is built into the fourth amendment itself. The
derivative evidence and contraband cases are natural extensions of
the rule, designed to offer meaningful remedies for trespassory violations, and to deprive the wrongdoing government of a continuing
benefit from its wrong. The idea that due process may require exclusion in certain cases of criminal or highly objectionable police conduct, discussed briefly below, has a different basis: the state must
obey the law in enforcing the law. "Deterrence," now claimed to be
the primary ground for exclusion, seems to have had no substantial
place in any of these conceptions of the practice.
It is true both (1) that in Wolf and Mapp the "right" and the
"remedy" were first separated, then rejoined, and (2) that the theory
of the Mapp majority was deterrence. But the vote of Justice Black,
essential to the result in Mapp, rested on a view derived from Boyd
22. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
23. In Weeks itself the Court ordered the return of certain letters and certificates, but was
silent as to the disposition of the lottery tickets; yet in Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921), the court ordered the return of illegally seized liquor on which tax had not been paid
(referring to the bottles as defendant's "property"), notwithstanding the fact that this was apparently contraband.
24. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). That exclusion was seen as a remedy for the violation of rights,
rather than as a method of deterrence, is made plain by the Court's refusal to exclude the
evidence from the trial of Aguello's codefendants, where rights had not been violated by the
search and seizure.
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that the exclusionary rule was constitutionally required because the
use of improperly seized evidence involved testimonial compulsion.
And in Wo!f the Court was led into the error of splitting the "right"
from the "remedy" by accepting the formulation of the issue before
it as the "incorporation" of the fourth amendment into the fourteenth. The question thus framed, it was natural for the federalist
Frankfurter to "incorporate" the substantive "core" but not the "remedial" - and presumably less important - fringe. Actually, of
course, the fourteenth amendment itself, without reference to the
fourth, speaks directly to every case in which a state officer interferes
with the liberty or property of an individual, and does so whether the
alleged interference takes the form of a search or seizure made by a
police officer or a fine or imprisonment imposed by a judge after
criminal trial. It thus explicitly requires the Court to make a body of
constitutional law governing state searches and seizures, a law that
might easily have been no less protective of the individual than the
fourth amendment, especially in its incorporated form, has proved to
be.25 When Frankfurter in Wo!fholds that the "security ... against
arbitrary intrusion"26 which is at the "core" of the fourth amendment applies to the states, he thus really holds nothing at all; when
he holds that the "remedy" does not apply to the states, he evades
the major thrust of the "due process of law" standard by which he is
plainly bound, for this standard is more obviously concerned with
remedy and procedure than with "substantive" rules. It would indeed have been more consistent with his stated federalist values to
reverse the holding in Wo!fi to provide that the states are free to set
widely varying standards of police conduct, but to hold that due process - if it is to mean anything at all - means that the state must
comply with its own law when it seeks to prosecute the citizen. This
is not the kind of discretionary skirt-cleaning that is usually meant
by talk about 'judicial integrity''; it is an insistence upon a fundamental element of due process of law itself.27 Holmes saw this, for
example, in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 28 and Frankfurter himself, in Rochin v. Cal!fornia, 29 was compelled to recognize
25. It seems clear, indeed, that the "incorporation" of the fourth amendment into the fourteenth has resulted not in raising the standards applicable to the states to the federal level but
in the deterioration of what had been a highly protective and fairly well-elaborated body of
law into a kind of due process interest-balancing. For a brief history of incorporation, see the
note by James E. Scarboro in J. SCARBORO & J. WHITE, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCE·
DURE, 67-82 (1976).
26. 338 U.S. at 27.
27. For an elaboration of this view, see Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: the Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. Rev. 251 (1974). But see
Monaghan, Foreword· Constitutional Common Law, 17ze Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89 HARV,
L. Rev. I (1975).
28. 277 U.S. 438, 469-71 (1928).
29. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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that the only appropriate response to the blatant brutality and illegality of the case was to hold that due process was violated when the
evidence (obtained by an emetic) was admitted in a criminal trial. In
Rochin exclusion was imposed not to deter police from behaving
badly in other cases, but to insist upon the right of the individual to
be treated by officers and the courts in a way that accords with the
rule of law, which means in a fundamentally decent way. 30
There is an additional difficulty with Wolf that reaches deeply
into our own time. In holding that the states should be free to
choose among various remedies to find the one that worked best in
local circumstances, Frankfurter made no allusion to the nature of
the remedies in fact adopted by Colorado. (Indeed, he made no allusion of any kind to the particular facts of that case, which for all
the reader knows are as bad as or worse than those of Rochin.) This
failure to address the quality of Colorado's remedies is in a sense
understandable, for on such a question the Court cannot function at
a very high level, to say the least. What, after all, does the Court
know about the social effects of various alternative rules, and how
can it learn what it does not know? But Frankfurter's own reasoning
should have required him to address it, and to fail to do so at all
makes a hash of his claim to take seriously the rights he supposedly
asserts.
The ''workability" or "deterrence" feature of the "exclusionary
rule" discourse in fact has three unfortunate consequences. First is
that already alluded to, that it is not a rule the courts can sensibly
apply or administer. Second, when deterrence - rather than the
protection of the defendant's right to due process at the hand of the
state that seeks to convict him - becomes the basis for exclusion,
that shift generates an enormous pressure for reduction of the scope
of the rule: in each case the real cost of the possible release of a
guilty defendant is weighed against the merely contingent advantage
of the marginal deterrent impact of exclusion in a diffuse and unknown future. 31 The decisions cutting back on the rule in a wide
variety of situations thus flow directly from the Court's ideology of
deterrence; that fact may indeed go far to explain the Court's resist30. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (states must "respect certain decencies of civilized conduct"). But see United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 132-33 (N.D.
Ohio 1977), qffd, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), revd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). The District Court
in Payner granted standing to insure that police practices as "outrageously illegal" as in Rochin
would be deterred in the future.
31. There is another possible view: that the deterrent rationale requires exclusion of improperly seized evidence in all cases, under all circumstances, for the police must be deprived
of every possible benefit of their wrong if the deterrence is to work. See, e.g., People v. Martin,
45 Cal. 2d 755, 759-61, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955). How is a responsible choice to be made
between these views? The fact that the choice between them cannot really be reasoned, but
must remain attitudinal, itself reflects the institutional defectiveness of the deterrence ideology
itself.
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ance to taking any other view of the matter.32
Third, and perhaps most important, in so conceiving of the rule,
the Court is not operating on the idea that its task is to be faithful to
judgments that the Constitution has authoritatively expressed in
more or less intelligible language, which the Court must interpret
against the twin backgrounds of historical context and present life,
but is instead regarding the Constitution as a general warrant for the
judicial determination of the "reasonableness" of government action
in the light of the costs and benefits of alternative classifications and
programs. This at a blow destroys the ethical basis upon which judicial authority rests, namely, fidelity to the authoritative judgments of
others; its intellectual basis, namely, that this authority is to be defined and exercised by informed inquiry into the legal traditions that
underlie the Constitution and our own past; 33 and its political basis,
for the Court can no longer be regarded as the servant of our Constitution, but as an agency to be staffed with people who share certain
dispositions that shall guide conduct when the facts are less than perfectly clear. And the rhetoric of "deterrence" actually ensures that
the class of cases so governed will be very large indeed: while the
simple structure of that rhetoric is scientific - it is an inquiry into
those facts that define the costs and benefits that determine the result
- the inquiry can never be performed in an adequate way, and the
reality thus is that the decision must rest not upon those grounds, but
upon prior dispositions or unarticulated intuitions that are never justified. 34 The language of "workability" and social planning obscures
32. The idea of deterrence also leads naturally to the present nostrum, that the sanction
should not be applied to "good faith and reasonable" conduct, for many of the same reasons
that strict liability deterrent measures are thought irrational or unfair in the criminal law. This
exemption may be harmless enough if the standard of "reasonableness" is that applied in
criminal law (i.e., that of one who knows and understands the law), which already makes
allowance for reasonable errors (in the definition of probable cause, for example, or of the kind
of exigency that excuses a search warrant). If, however, as its proponents evidently wish, a
lower standard is applied, ignorance will be encouraged, and the courts will become involved
in impossible efforts to determine double layers of reasonableness. Another possibility for
limiting the exclusionary rule now under consideration in Illinois v. Gates, 51 U.S.L.W. 3415
(U.S. Nov. 29, 1982) (No. 81430), is to hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply where the
officer obtains a warrant, on the ground that he had done all he could or should, and that the
error is a judicial one, to be corrected as judicial errors are. Proponents of such a position
often look for support to Michigan v. DeFilippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), holding an arrest under a
statute later held invalid not to call for the remedy of exclusion. But the two cases are wholly
inapposite: the improper statute can be held invalid, and destroyed as a ground for further
unconstitutional action; each warrant by contrast stands on its own feet, and the invalidation
of one will have no effect in other cases. And in any event, without the exclusionary (or other
as yet unspecified) remedy, the judicial errors will remain wholly uncorrected. It is also to
some degree unrealistic to speak of magistrates as if they were automatically independent and
neutral; those qualities are in fact ensured only by the kind of review of their judgments that
the exclusionary rule makes possible.
33. See, e.g., Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1054-55
(1981).
34. Even when employed by a legislature or a legislative commission, of course, cost-benefit analysis rests on weak and largely unexamined foundations. For an amusing instance of
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or denies the responsibility of the individual judge for the decision
he or she is making in the case, by giving it a false scientific form;
this, in tum, denies all of us the benefits of a judicial process in
which judges acknowledge their ultimately personal responsibility
for their decision, which they are obliged to justify in their opinions,
and for which it is their duty to educate their minds by the experience of argument and thought.
The historical point made here may be thought by some to be
irrelevant, especially since Boyd in all its aspects has been overruled,35 and since it is now commonly said that the fourth amendment is concerned not with property but with privacy. But if this
history is to be disregarded, the decision ought at least to be knowingly made. As for the other point - that the language of deterrence
involves the Court in a set of judgments that it is incompetent to
make, and avoids those more particular judgments that it is its duty
to make - the difficulty, of course, extends far beyond the exclusionary rule, for this is just one instance of a modem judicial tendency that has become so deeply settled in the contemporary mind
as to determine the very structure, for some people, of what is meant
by the judicial function, the legal process, and rationality itself. The
temporary dominance of this tendency does not mean, however, that
it is not to be deplored.
To return to Boyd, that Court can be seen to have identified two
themes - property and the distinction between civil and criminal
proceedings - upon which one could construct what might be called
a pure theory of the fourth amendment, reading something like this:
one's property is constitutionally immune from seizure, for the reasons stated, and the government must forgo any benefits it acquires
by the violation of such property rights. This would lead to the exclusion of contraband seized in a search without probable cause, for
cost-benefit analysis running itself into the ground, see COMMISSION ON THE THIRD LONDON
AIRPORT, REPORT (1971), reprinted in J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, 700-06 (1973).
For an illuminating analysis of the ways in which risks - and benefits as well - are not
objectively determined but culturally constituted, see M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK
AND CULTURE (1982). The Brief for the United States in Illinois v. Gates, 51 U.S.L.W. 3415
(U.S. Nov. 29, 1982) (No. 81430), is a good representative of the kind of argument generated
by the deterrent rationale and the judicial cost-benefit method.
35. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407-08 (1976):
Several of Boyd's express or implicit declarations have not stood the test of time. The
application of the fourth amendment to subpoenas was limited by Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906), and more recent cases. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946). Purely evidentiary (but "nontestimonial") materials, as well as contraband and fruits and instrumentalities of crime, may now be searched for and seized under
f>roper circumstances, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Also, any notion that "testimonial" evidence may never be seized and used in evidence is inconsistent with Katz v.
United Slates, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Osburn v. United Stales, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), approving the seizure under appropriate circumstances of conversations of a person suspected of crime. See also Marron v. United Stales,
275 U.S. 192 (1927) (footnote omitted). See also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463
(1976).
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example, and of conversations overheard through a bug planted by
tresprass. Mere words, being intangible, cannot themselves be the
object of an impermissible seizure - Olmstead is right so far - and
no fourth amendment question is presented by eavesdropping in a
public place. But, by the same token, words are not "persons or
things" within the requirement that a warrant particularly describe
"the persons or things to be seized"; therefore no warrant could
properly issue for trespassory bugging. (Olmstead could be regarded
either as trespassory or as nontrespassory under this rule, as could
Katz.)
For different reasons exclusion should be required in two other
kinds of cases as well, of which Olmstead represents one: where evidence is obtained by official crime, due process should forbid its use.
The other is related to the "civil search" power which, as Boyd recognized, is greater than the power to search for evidence of crime:
one thinks of civil discovery, administrative inspections, frisks compelled by considerations of safety, quarantine roadblocks, and the
like, where extensive intrusions are justified by their civil and evenhanded character. Such intrusions should be kept to their ostensible
purpose, by excluding evidence of crime obtained thereby. 36

36. On this point see note 21 supra.

